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20 November 1961

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Attached is an article which you will note appeared in NEWSWEEK of 4 December 1961.

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[redacted] consider this very interesting because, as you will recall, in about 1950 we had in the ARTICHOKE a considerable interest in the hypospray.

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If you recall, we made an effort to have it tested and used but if memory serves me correctly it was frowned upon by some of your medical colleagues for various and sundry reasons. If you recall, we thought it quite possibly could be used in the "H" work, possibly as a general anesthetic type of thing for kidnapping or for other equally esoteric reasons. Anyway, the upshot of it was that a couple of papers were written, and we got nowhere, probably because we didn't have [redacted] support at this time.

We note in there that STASHINSKY claims he was decorated by the Order of the Red Banner, and [redacted] feel under the circumstances that the least that could be done for us is an Employee Award of a dollar and a half cash. Anyway, without attaching this note to it, you might find it interesting to show this to Dr. Tietjen et al.

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Oh, well

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CPYRGHT



Deutsche Presse-Agentur, GmbH, Frankfurt-Main
Assassin Stashinsky: Poison gun

A Killer's Confession

One of the cold war's most fascinating murder mysteries was solved last week—or was it? These were the facts:

On the night of Oct. 15, 1959, the body of a 50-year-old Ukrainian anti-Communist named Stefan Bandera was discovered in his Munich home, slumped across the stairs, dead. It looked like a heart attack, but an autopsy showed Bandera had been poisoned with cyanide.

Well aware that Bandera was the chief of a Ukrainian "Insurgent Army" that hoped, one day, to invade Russia, his German friends assumed his assassination had been ordered in Moscow. But until last week no one could be sure. Then the West Germans announced that a former Russian citizen had surrendered to the police.

The killer's name—or so he said—was Bogdan N. Stashinsky. His employer: The Kremlin. Himself a Ukrainian, Stashinsky had murdered his victim with a specially built squirt gun that fired a spray of vaporized cyanide at such high pressure that it penetrated the skin, killing instantly and leaving no mark on the corpse. As a reward, Stashinsky claimed to have been decorated with the Order of the Red Banner by the boss of Russia's secret-police.

Why did Stashinsky surrender?

His own story is that his wife persuaded him to. Mrs. Stashinsky, an East German girl, disliked living in Moscow. When she became pregnant, the secret police allowed her to go home to East Berlin to have her baby. The baby died last Aug. 8 and, in despair, the Stashinskys fled West just before the border was closed on Aug. 13.

But Stashinsky's confession to murder meant possible life imprisonment. So why had he given himself up? The only explanation police could offer was that a worse fate awaited him in the East.

Newsweek
12-4-61

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28 July 1961

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Dear [redacted]

ILLEGIB

I just received word that in the [redacted] case the guy was not broken by the use of the polygraph but by the use of some drug. A medical team came out of the Pentagon consisting of two Colonels and some other individual. The drug was administered orally and, in this particular case, quite successfully.

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I have no further details and it may be that you fellows back there know all about this. It is being reported back officially and a copy will come to Security.

[redacted]

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ILLEGIB

As of 18 Sept 61

[redacted]

has given no information. He is changing quickly, other his associates in the military.

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Dear [redacted]

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Reference is made to numerous cables concerning the case, the latest one in our possession being the cable from [redacted] [redacted] which arrived here 2 January 1962.

As you realize, our interest in the case is in connection with the ARTICHOKE-type activity carried out by apparently the military in connection with this case. We have talked to [redacted] and also to our sources here, but we have been unable to come up with any information concerning this particular activity or the individuals participating in it in any way. [redacted] is convinced that the drug is not the P-1 but is possibly an amphetamine type.

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We think that through your sources, and particularly your interest in the [redacted] case, you might be able to obtain technical information in this connection. While it is recognized that extreme care must be used in seeking this information since the cables all indicate this is most sensitive and our sources on the scene must not be exposed, we nevertheless believe that some sort of inquiry could be made so that we could subsequently learn the nature of the drugs used and the techniques.

If the technical reports cannot be obtained or at least a resume of these reports, perhaps the names of the participating personnel could be obtained and we could examine them to see if we had any point of contact.

We are most anxious to learn the nature of this operation, particularly since there was some success indicated and the Army apparently is considering using it world-wide, which as you recall is in direct contrast to their previously stated position on using chemicals in connection with interrogation.

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EX-1 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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TO :

[Redacted]

DATE:

13 Jan 50

FROM :

SUBJECT:

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[Redacted] will look into the case
at Hongkong & Shiuwa of
[Redacted] for the purpose of
surveying the use of Article 16.
He will then cable his opinion for
your affrod or disaffrod. Please
mail us this case [Redacted]

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Further information on the Security Office position is that Security has felt that the use of drugs under any circumstances is dangerous and that such use should only be made after it has been clearly determined that other means of obtaining the information are unsuccessful. The Security approach to the problem is as follows.

1. ARTICHOKE techniques involving the use of any type drugs should only be undertaken after it has been determined that the action is necessary in the National interest and its use outweighs the inherent dangers involved.

2. The consideration of the use of ARTICHOKE techniques should first be considered from the standpoint of the locale of the operation, the political climate of the geographical area involved, the dangers of publicity, the availability of facilities for carrying out the operation, and whether reasonable security can be expected in the course of the operation.

3. Having satisfied the above elements, Security feels that the technique to be used and the drug to be employed is a decision arrived at based on the peculiar circumstances of each case considering the health of the individual, the availability of the individual to the opposition after the operation, the personal characteristics of the individual, and the nature of the information to be obtained. The selection of the drug to be used has always been at the determination of the Medical Division.

4. The above considerations having been met, Security then insists upon a highly organized and carefully controlled operation to carry out the ARTICHOKE Mission with authority granted to the ARTICHOKE Team for (a) the Medical Officer to stop the operation if it appears warranted from a medical standpoint and (b) Security to stop the operation if it appears there are uncontrollable security developments.

5. Security strongly feels that the above decisions should be arrived at through full coordination of the interested parties bringing in medical, security, and area division considerations, and not at any time through the unilateral decision of any one single component without relationship to the others.

Security has always maintained that it is fallacious to believe that one drug serves all purposes and can be used

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as a stock item. Further, Security insists that the application of drugs in ARTICHOKE techniques always be through a medical officer present at all times during the proceedings. Security is interested in any new drug that is developed and feels that a series of drugs should be available for use as the circumstances determine. Lastly, Security regards the use of drugs which may possibly affect the health of an individual as an activity which can have the most serious unfavorable repercussions if the operation is ill planned or compromised, and recognizes at the same time that the information derived from the use of drugs is largely limited. The Security Office would welcome any conference where this problem could be further discussed.

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been stated many times previously in that under ARTICHOKE documents they were charged with the responsibility of carrying out in operational use unconventional interrogations involving drugs and chemicals. [REDACTED] ILLEGIB with full cooperation, knowledge, consent and with the actual physical handling [REDACTED] ILLEGIB of the drug by medical officers did the ARTICHOKE techniques be used. The Security office has always considered that TSS had a reserve responsibility in this connection not only for the discovery of new material for use in ARTICHOKE but for new techniques and new ideas in this connection. The Security Office also felt that it was the responsibility of OSI to very carefully screen all intelligence material, scientific data in foreign countries, etc., for new techniques, new drugs, or access of drugs or chemicals in connection with interrogations. [REDACTED] ILLEGIB .. [REDACTED] ILLEGIB

For the record it should be noted that the term new drugs or chemicals has never been defined, nor has there been any but "informal" reporting in connection with research on new drugs or chemicals or new techniques. Further the Security Office has never engaged in experimental work along these lines except in a general sense in the field of hypnosis, plus some general study in the area of new drugs and chemicals for information purposes only.

In the actual use of drugs or chemicals for interrogation purposes certain elements have always been considered by the Office of Security. Among these are the following:

1. The Security Office will undertake ARTICHOKE if the national interest overweighs the inherent dangers involved, the chance of unfavorable publicity or that the end results cannot be achieved by other more standard means.

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2. The Security Office, in carrying out ARTICHOKE, acts only if a decision to interrogate under drugs is agreed on by all interested part [redacted] if Medical concurrence is obtained and finally full approval has been given by Chief, Ops.

3. Every element has been considered before ARTICHOKE is carried out. Every element is very carefully weighed and the chances of success are studied carefully. The locale of the operation is studied, the political environment of the area is considered. The chances of publicity, the available facilities for the operation, the general security of the operation in every aspect. The question of whether or not the individual will have knowledge of the ARTICHOKE operation after it has been completed and the ultimate disposition of the individual. All are weighed before ARTICHOKE is carried out.

The Security Office has not determined what drug shall be used, but has accepted the advice of the Medical Division in each case. The problem of exactly what information is desired is also studied to determine whether or not a particular drug is most suitable and again this has been left to the Medical Division although the Security Office is informed of most drugs and chemicals in this area. Even hypnosis has not been attempted except in cooperation with the Medical Office present and with their guidance and assistance. As stated previously, always the physical and mental condition of the Subject has been carefully studied prior to the actual use of ARTICHOKE.

It is the specific policy of the Security Office that ARTICHOKE will only be used under very highly controlled circumstances with every element studied and every weakness guarded against and when possible with all chances of unfortunate accidents or publicity are eliminated.

The Security Office believes that a conference again setting out responsibilities and safe guards in connection with the use of drugs or chemicals or a other element in unconventional interrogation is a good idea. The Security Of believes at this time all current information should be disclosed and all know of new chemicals, new drugs, new techniques or ideas should be discussed and studied.

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief/SaS

DATE: 14 October 1957

25X1 FROM :

SUBJECT: Artichoke Materials and Apparatus -- Transfer of

Authorization is requested for transfer of Artichoke materials and apparatus held by the writer to [redacted] C/MS/PCD - SSS for his permanent retention or destruction as determined by his professional opinion.


In view of present working agreements between SRS/OS and the Medical Division, requirements for any future Artichoke cases can be obtained through [redacted] as required, hence storage of materials and apparatus in SRS is unnecessary and hazardous.

Attached is an itemized list of Artichoke materials and apparatus now held by the writer.

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SRS/MA



OK to transfer.

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14 Oct 1957

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Serotonin Creatinine Sulfate - Code No. 87900 Lot. No. 5448 - 1 Bot.
LSD-25, Sandoz Chem. Works - 11 Boxes, 6 ampuls ea.
Sodium Amytal - White unlabeled - 37 vials
Sodium Pentothal - Yellow unlabeled - 21 vials
Amytal Sodium, ampuls in original package, Lily No. 388, 8271-513946 37 ampuls
Pentothal Sodium, Abbott, List No. 3158, 0.5 Gm. 12 vials
Serpasil, Ciba, 0.25 mg. 25 tablets
Thorazine, Smith, Kline & French Research Labs, Code: CS 4949 RSO #30275, 10 Gr
Dial with Urethane, Ciba, 131702, 2 cc. size, 2 Boxes, 5 ampuls ea.
Chloral Hydrate, 88-070, 8.3'50 30 Grams
Amytal Sodium, Lily No. 222 9264-512967, 150 capsules
Dial (diallylbarbituric) Ciba 100 tablets
U-4905 (2854-RHJ-19) Upjohn Co. Research Labs, 1 vial - 133.7 mg.
Coramine, Ciba, 61636, 25 ampuls, 1.5 cc size
Caffeine and Sodium Benzoate, Sharpe and Dohme, 4 ampuls 0.5 gm. ea.
Desoxyn Hydrochloride, Abbott, List No. 3378, 4 ampuls 20 mg. ea.
Benzedrine Sulfate, Smith, Kline and French. 51 Boxes - 6 20-mg. ampuls ea.
Phenobarbital, Premo Pharmaceutical Labs, 100 Tablets (approx.) 0.0324 gm. ea.
Morphine Sulfate, soluble hypodermic, 1/8 gr., 20 ampuls
Scopolamine hydrobromide, hypodermic, 1/100 gr., 20 ampuls
1/8 oz. of what is presumed to be Mariahuana extract.
1 Hypodermic Syringe - 1/10 cc - B D Luer-lok
3 10 cc Ideal Lock Hypodermic Syringes

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : ARTICHOKE Representatives

DATE: 16 July 1953

FROM : Director of Security

SUBJECT: ARTICHOKE; Restatement of Program

1. Reference is made to attached SO memorandum dated 21 November 1952 addressed to the Assistant Director, OSI; Chief, Medical Staff; and Chief, OTS, the subject, "Project ARTICHOKE."

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2. Reference is also made to the informal conference held Thursday, 9 July 1953 with [redacted]
[redacted] and the writer present.

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3. At the above-mentioned conference held 9 July 1953, Colonel Edwards stated he felt in view of the expanding work being carried out in all fields in the ARTICHOKE program and with the constantly enlarging numbers of contacts and consultants and the imminent possibility of experimental work being undertaken both in the United States and overseas, it would be well to redefine the specific interests and activities of all those working with the Project ARTICHOKE and bring up to date and set out for examination the present and future plans of each group engaged in this work. Colonel Edwards said he felt that in order to prevent duplication of effort and to increase and stimulate interest and activity on behalf of ARTICHOKE, and particularly to bend every effort to find new methods, new techniques, new chemicals, etc. which would work to the benefit of this Agency, all parties interested should re-examine their work and understand clearly how each group would work with and support the activities of the others involved in the ARTICHOKE program.

4. The basic memorandum referred to in Paragraph 1 above very clearly sets forth in general terms the responsibilities of the Medical Staff, of OTS, OSI and of SO in connection with the ARTICHOKE program. This memorandum also affixes and assigns in general terms the various responsibilities of the participating groups and affirms that these responsibilities had been concurred in previously in a staff study dated 27 August 1952.

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5. Colonel Edwards further stated in the above-mentioned conference that there were many places where responsibilities would lie jointly between various participating groups and there would be a great deal of overlapping since it appeared obvious the field was tremendous and the effort now covered so many diverse activities.

6. It is felt that a restatement of the aims of ARTICHOKE is essential at this time. Briefly, these basic aims may be stated as follows:


- a. To perfect techniques utilizing existing drugs, hypnosis, and other elements for the extraction of information from individuals whether willing or not.
- b. To provide field teams for testing, experimenting and refining techniques utilizing currently known and recommended new materials for the extraction of information from indigenous personnel under field conditions.
- c. In coordination with TSS and the Medical Staff arrange for research and experimentation within the facilities of those two components for the development of means for the control of the activities and mental capacities of individuals whether willing or not.
- d. Conduct liaison and initial research in fields and areas not within the immediate capabilities of TSS and the Medical Staff for the development of ideas and possible means of exerting control over the activities and mental capacities of individuals.
- e. Control the operational use of ARTICHOKE techniques and serve as the support element to the operational components in the use of such techniques.
- f. Explore means through indoctrination and training of prevent the enemy from gaining control over the activities and mental capacities of Agency personnel.
- g. Serve as the coordinating element among all components for the Agency on those matters concerning the operational use of ARTICHOKE techniques.
- h. Arrange for the exchange of information concerning ARTICHOKE techniques and research and development among those elements primarily concerned as OSI, TSS, Medical Division, DDP and Security Office.

SECURITY INFORMATION

i. Conduct authorized liaison with other components of government in the ARTICHOKE field and arrange for liaison responsibility through the Agency component having the most pertinent interest in new projects or activities in other departments having bearing on the overall ARTICHOKE project.

7. It should be recognized that there are many facets of possible ARTICHOKE interest which have never been adequately explored from the standpoint operational ARTICHOKE use. TSS and the Medical Division will be expected, from the framework of their capabilities, to conduct the basic research as to whether or not such elements have any possible application to operational use for ARTICHOKE purposes. The introduction of new ideas and new techniques are the responsibility of all components concerned and should be presented by each component with as much background material as is possible. In this capacity the Security Office will maintain contact and liaison with scientific and technical specialists in these fields for the basic development of ideas and the suggestions of new means for possible use in ARTICHOKE. Such action will be conducted in full coordination with the other interested components to insure that there is no duplication of effort.

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Sherald Edwards
Colonel, GSC

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21 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director, OSI
Chief, Medical Staff
Chief, CTS

SUBJ: CT : Project ARTICHOKE

1. Reference is made to the staff study dated 29 August 1952 from Assistant Director/OSI to DD/P, DD/I and DC/A. The staff study has been concurred in by the appropriate officers wherein the responsibility for Project ARTICHOKE has been allocated as follows:

a. Overall responsibility for the project should be transferred from OSI to I&SO.

b. I&SO should call upon the research and support facilities of CIA Medical Staff and of the Office of Technical Services as required.

c. Liaison with the Research and Development Board and with the Service components should be the responsibility of I&SO.

d. Responsibility for the evaluation of foreign intelligence aspects of the project should remain in OSI.

2. In conformity with the above allocation of responsibility for Project ARTICHOKE, I&SO delegates responsibility for the implementation of this project as follows:

a. The Chief, Medical Staff should be responsible for medical research in support of this project which shall consist of research of a basic and operational nature determined by Chief, Medical Staff, as appropriate and necessary within the scope of his facilities in support of this project. In addition, Chief, Medical Staff will conduct research and furnish operational support in response to requests by I&SO and within the limits of facilities available to the Medical Staff. Requests by I&SO will consist of specific elements of research, materials and personnel in support of operational use of Project ARTICHOKE.

b. Chief of CTS has advised that in view of lack of facilities and other requirements, his staff is not in a position to undertake full-scale support of this program as outlined. In a like vein, CIO advises it will not undertake operations within this project on its own but will restrict itself to laboratory type research and experimentation. In accordance with this understanding CTS will conduct,

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within limitations of their facilities, research in the basic fields of science in support of this project. In addition, OIS will conduct, within limitations of their facilities, specific research, other than medical, requested by I&SO in support of operational aspects of Project ANTICRIME.

3. Liaison with the Research and Development board in support of this Project will be the responsibility of OIS under an arrangement already effected by OIS.

4. Responsibility for evaluation of foreign intelligence aspects of Project ANTICRIME will remain with OSI.

5. I&SO will conduct liaison with the Service components concerned in this problem and in relation to operational aspects of Project ANTICRIME.

6. OIS and Medical Staff each have established liaison with the Service components in conformity with their respective fields of responsibilities and it is foreseen that research conducted by OIS and Medical Staff in support of Project ANTICRIME will include liaison with the Service components in this regard. For the sake of clarification, I&SO will restrict its liaison to operational aspects of ANTICRIME and OIS and Medical Staff will restrict their liaison, as regards ANTICRIME, to the research fields. In order to prevent duplication and some crossing of channels, coordination and exchange of information in this regard will be necessary between the three elements concerned.

7. In order that information and activities may be appropriately discussed, I&SO will call monthly meetings of Medical Staff, OIS and I&SO.

8. In order to provide facilities for the actual use of ANTICRIME, I&SO will budget for and recruit personnel for the establishment of at least two teams.

9. Concurrence in the above allocation of responsibilities is requested.


Sheffield Edwards
Colonel, CSC
Security Officer, CIA

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~~D R A F T~~ Security Information

MEMORANDUM TO: ARTICHOKE Representatives
FROM : Director of Security
SUBJECT : ARTICHOKE; Restatement of Program

1. Reference is made to memorandum dated 26 November 1952 addressed to AD/OSI; Chief, Medical Staff; and Chief, OTS from Security Officer, CIA, subject "Project ARTICHOKE."
2. In accordance with discussions at the July and August ARTICHOKE meetings, it is felt that a restatement of the aims of ARTICHOKE is essential at this time, together with a re-definition of the functions of the ARTICHOKE participants. Also included in this restatement will be certain additions to principles stated in above-mentioned memorandum that have been agreed on in meetings of ARTICHOKE representatives during the past several months:
3. Aims:
 - a. Perfect techniques utilizing existing drugs, hypnosis and other elements for the extraction of information from individuals whether willing or not.
 - b. Provide field teams for testing, experimenting and refining techniques utilizing currently known and recommended new materials for the extraction of information from indigenous personnel under field conditions.
 - c. In coordination with TSS and the Medical Staff arrange for research and experimentation within the facilities of these two components for the development of means for the control of the activities and individuals whether willing or not.

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- d. Conduct liaison and initial research in fields and areas not within the immediate capabilities of TSS and the Medical Staff for the development of ideas and possible means of exerting control over the activities and mental capacities of individuals.
- e. Control the operational use of ARTICHOKE techniques and serve as the support element to the operational components in the use of such techniques.
- f. Explore means through indoctrination and training of preventing the enemy from gaining control over the activities and mental capacities of Agency personnel.
- g. Serve as the coordinating element among all components for the Agency on those matters concerning the operational use of ARTICHOKE techniques.
- h. Arrange for the exchange of information concerning ARTICHOKE techniques and research and development among those elements primarily concerned, as OSI, TSS, Medical Division, DD/P and Security Office.
- i. Conduct authorized liaison with other components of government in the ARTICHOKE field, and arrange for liaison responsibility through the Agency component having the most pertinent interest in new projects or activities in other departments having bearing on the overall ARTICHOKE project.

4. Functions:

- a. The Chief, Medical Staff, should be responsible for medical research in support of this project which shall consist of

research of a basic and operational nature determined by Chief Medical Staff, as appropriate and necessary within the scope of his facilities in support of this project. In addition, Chief Medical Staff, will conduct research and furnish operational support in response to requests by the Security Office and within the limits of facilities available to the Medical Staff. Requests by the Security Office will consist of specific elements of research, materials and personnel in support of operational use of Project ARTICHOKE. The Chief, Medical Staff will provide medical support for ARTICHOKE field teams.

- b. TSS will conduct, within limitations of their facilities, research in the basic fields of science in support of this project. In addition, TSS will conduct, within limitations of their facilities, specific research, other than medical, requested by the Security Office in support of operational aspects of Project ARTICHOKE.
- c. Liaison with the Research and Development Board in support of this Project will be the responsibility of TSS under an arrangement already effected by TSS.
- d. Responsibility for evaluation of foreign intelligence aspects of Project ARTICHOKE will remain with OSI.
- e. Security Office will conduct liaison with the Service components concerned in this problem and in relation to operational aspects of Project ARTICHOKE.

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Security Information

f. TSS and Medical Staff each have established liaison with the Service components in conformity with their respective fields of responsibilities and it is foreseen that research conducted by TSS and Medical Staff in support of Project ARTICHOKE will include liaison with the Service components in this regard. For the sake of clarification, Security Office will restrict its liaison to operational aspects of ARTICHOKE and TSS and Medical Staff will restrict their liaison, as regards ARTICHOKE, to the research fields. In order to prevent duplication, and some crossing of channels, coordination and exchange of information in this regard will be necessary between the three elements concerned.

g. DD/P will provide a representative to attend ARTICHOKE meetings. This representative will furnish necessary operational guidance and support from DD/P standpoint for implementation of ARTICHOKE.

h. Representatives designated by DD/P; AD/OSI; Director of Security; Chief, Medical Staff; and Chief, OTS shall constitute the ARTICHOKE Committee.

i. The ARTICHOKE Committee will meet monthly or more often as necessary when such meetings are called by the Director of Security or his representative.

j. In order to provide facilities for the actual use of ARTICHOKE Security Office has budgeted for and is recruiting personnel

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SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ARTICHOKE COMMITTEE

It is recommended that the following form and content be accepted and approved as being the Aims and Responsibilities in the ARTICHOKE program.

1. The Director of Security shall be responsible for the ARTICHOKE program.
2. The aims of the ARTICHOKE program are as follows:
 - a. To perfect techniques utilizing existing drugs, hypnosis, and other elements for the extraction of information from individuals whether willing or not.
 - b. To explore means through research indoctrination and training for preventing the enemy from gaining control over the activities and mental capacities of Agency personnel.
 - c. When necessary and consistent with Agency policy and operational security, support CIA operations through the use of ARTICHOKE techniques.
3. The following responsibilities and functions will apply to the ARTICHOKE program:

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- a. The Director of Security will be responsible for the general direction, administration and execution of the ARTICHOKE aims as defined in 2.a, -b and -c, above.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

- b. The Director of Security will provide field teams for testing, experimenting and refining techniques utilizing currently known and recommended new materials for the extraction of information from indigenous personnel under field conditions.
- c. The Director of Security will arrange, in coordination with TSS and the Medical Staff, for research and experimentation within the facilities of those two components for the development of means for the control of the activities and mental capacities of individuals whether willing or not.
- d. The Director of Security will conduct liaison and research in fields and areas not within the immediate capabilities of TSS and the Medical Staff for the development of ideas and possible means of exerting control over the activities and mental capacities of individuals.
- e. The Director of Security will control the operational use of ARTICHOKE techniques and serve as the support element to all operational components in the use of such techniques.
- f. The Director of Security will serve as the coordinating element among all components for the Agency on those matters concerning the operational use of ARTICHOKE techniques.
- g. The Director of Security will arrange for the exchange of information concerning ARTICHOKE techniques and research and de-

h. The Director of Security will conduct authorized liaison with other components of government in the ARTICHOKE field and arrange for liaison responsibility through the Agency component having the most pertinent interest in new projects or activities in other departments having bearing on the overall ARTICHOKE project.

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SUBJECT: The use of Drugs or Chemicals in Unconventional Interrogation

For a number of years prior to 1952 the use of drugs or chemicals ("truth serum") in unconventional interrogation was studied by the Office of Security generally speaking, acting in cooperation with OSI, who prior to 1952 was the coordinating point of this type of activity within the Agency. Drugs and hypnosis were experimentally tried by the Office of Security as early as 1949 by an SO Team under a project then known as BLUEBIRD and as early as 1951 actual interrogations in using drugs were conducted by a combined team of Security CI and Medical Division personnel. In 1952, when operational control of the so-called ARTICHOKE work was passed to the Security Office, drugs were used in a number of cases at all times supported by the Medical Division, all under the so-called ARTICHOKE Program. This type of interrogation has been carried on at rare intervals up until 1956 (?) with a number of requests from the field for ARTICHOKE interrogation being presented to Security in 1957, although no actual work was done during that year.

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In all of the above ARTICHOKE cases the use of the drug or chemical (except in certain experimental work with the U.S. Navy [redacted] the drugs or chemicals involved were determined by the Medical Division and the Medical officers present during actual ARTICHOKE operations. The drug determined upon was always chosen by the medical personnel after very careful study of the subject's physical and mental condition and with all security provisions satisfied. ARTICHOKE to date while familiar with the LSD-25 (a 2,5-dimethyl-4-hydroxy-3-indole derivative and referred to as "LSD" in the field) are not familiar with other unusual cases. Security, on the other hand, is familiar with at least some of the P-1 experimental work carried on by TSS, although Security has not been briefed on any new discoveries or techniques, particularly in connection with P-1 in at least a year. The Security Office

been stated many times previously in that under ARTICHOKE documents they were charged with the responsibility of carrying out in operational use unconventional interrogations involving drugs and chemicals. Security further has held that any use of the drugs or chemicals in interrogation is dangerous and that only with full cooperation, knowledge, consent and with the actual physical handling of the drug by medical officers did the ARTICHOKE techniques be used. The Security office has always considered that TCS had a reserve responsibility in this connection not only for the discovery of new material for use in ARTICHOKE but for new techniques and new ideas in this connection. The Security Office also felt that it was the responsibility of CSI to very carefully screen all intelligence material, scientific data in foreign countries, etc., for new techniques, new drugs, or access of drugs or chemicals in connection with interrogations.

For the record it should be noted that the term new drugs or chemicals has never been defined, nor has there been any but "informal" reporting in connection with research on new drugs or chemicals or new techniques. Further the Security Office has never engaged in experimental work along these lines except in a general sense in the field of hypnosis, plus some general study in the area of new drugs and chemicals for information purposes only.

In the actual use of drugs or chemicals for interrogation purposes certain elements have always been considered by the Office of Security. Among these are the following:

1. The Security Office will undertake ARTICHOKE if the material in overweights the inherent dangers involved, the chance of unfavorable public reaction, or that the end results cannot be achieved by other more standard means.

2. The Security Office, in carrying out ANTICHOKE, acts only if a decision to interrogate under drugs is agreed on by all interested part if Medical concurrence is obtained and finally full approval has been giv
b. Chief, Ops.

3. Every element has been considered before ANTICHOKE is carried out. Every element is very carefully weighed and the chances of success are st carefully. The locale of the operation is studied, the political environ of the area is considered. The chances of publicity, the available facil for the operation, the general security of the operation in every aspect. The question of whether or not the individual will have knowledge of the ANTICHOKE operation after it has been completed and the ultimate disposit of the individual. All are weighed before ANTICHOKE is carried out.

The Security Office has not determined what drug shall be used, but has accepted the advice of the Medical Division in each case. The problem of exact what information is desired is also studied to determine whether or not a parti lar drug is most suitable and again this has been left to the Medical Division although the Security Office is informed of most drugs and chemicals in this . Even hypnosis has not been attempted except in cooperation with the Medical Of present and with their guidance and assistance. As stated previously, always physical and mental condition of the Subject has been carefully studied prior the actual use of ANTICHOKE.

It is the specific policy of the Security Office that ANTICHOKE will be used under very highly controlled circumstances with every element studied and every weakness guarded against and when possible with all chances of unfortunate accidents or publicity are eliminated.

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The Security Office believes that a conference again setting out responsibilities and safe guards in connection with the use of drugs or chemicals or other element in unconventional interrogation is a good idea. The Security Office believes at this time all current information should be disclosed and all types of new chemicals, new drugs, new techniques or ideas should be discussed and studied.

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PROJECT - ARTICHOKE
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